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Part XVII - brahman is the changeless substantive
Every object in the universe is made of finer components.
If so, what is the fundamental basis or material cause
for the whole Universe? Science has yet to find the
ultimate particles. According to Vedanta, consciousness
alone is the ultimate and it is part-less; i.e. it is
not made of any further components. That is defined
as Brahman. Interestingly Vedanta defines Brahman using
the converse statement: 'consciousness is Brahman' (praj~nAnaM
brahma), instead of stating directly that Brahman is
a conscious entity. This converse statement is a rigorous
one and, as discussed above, it defines the intrinsic
structure or svarUpa lakShaNa; i.e. it is both the necessary
and sufficient qualification for the object defined.
It means not only that ‘Brahman is consciousness’ but
that ‘consciousness is Brahman’ and there
are no two ways about it. The implication is that if
there is consciousness anywhere, by definition it has
to be Brahman. This is similar to the fact that if there
is H 2O anywhere it has to be water. Vedanta defines
Brahman using three statements: satyam, j~nAnam, anantam
brahma -existence-consciousness, knowledge and limitless
is Brahman. Since the definition is in this ‘converse’ form.
it is a svarUpa lakShaNa for Brahman. Hence, wherever
there is existence, that existence part is Brahman.
Wherever there is knowledge, that knowledge part is
Brahman (a statement that parallels the VP declarative
statement that perceptual knowledge is pure consciousness).
Finally, wherever there is limitlessness (which expresses
as happiness), that is Brahman.
All this discussion is intended to arrive at the fundamental
conclusion that the substantive for any object in this
universe is nothing other than Brahman. If the substantive
is Brahman and attributes belong to the object, then
the question is how do the attributes relate to the
substantive? According to Advaita Vedanta, there cannot
be any valid relation. One can talk about ‘relation’ only
for entities that are ontologically the same. But in
the case of objects, where there is no fundamental substantive
other than Brahman, there cannot be any valid relation
between Brahman and the attributes of the objects that
I perceive. Taking the example of the snake that is
projected where there is a rope, what is the relation
between the rope and the snake that I see? There cannot
be any valid relation between the two - other than saying
it is an error of superimposition or adhyAsa. When all
pervading existence-consciousness Brahman is seen as
varieties of objects just as gold is seen as varieties
of objects, the relation between the forms and the names
is only adhyAsa, an error of superimposition. What is
the relation between ring and the gold? Gold has nothing
to do with ring or bangle, since it exists just as gold
all the time without undergoing any mutations. ‘Ring’ is
just the name for a form; the relation is adhyAsa, a
superimposed form on gold and a name for that form.
Coming back to the topic, nyAya vaisheShika-s consider
the samavAya [constant conjunction] that relates an
attribute to its substantive as a fundamental eternal
entity. VP dismisses this as baseless. VP says the whole
universe is transitory; that is, it keeps changing continuously.
If something is changing continuously, then there has
to be some substantive that remains changeless in the
changing things. If ring changes into bangle, and bangle
into necklace, there has to be a substantive that is
different from a ring or necklace that remain as changeless
in all these changes. In this case, it is the gold that
remains changeless as the ring changes to bangle and
bangle to necklace, etc. Hence if the world is continuously
changing as we can see, then there has to be a changeless
entity in the changing things. Hence Brahman alone can
be the changeless substantive for the transient universe.
Given the transitory nature of the universe, to talk
about jAti [generic attribute] and samavAya as eternal
and inherent entities is meaningless. To talk about
the generic attributes like jarhood or cowness or horseness,
etc., as eternal entities, when the whole universe itself
is transient, also has little meaning.
Similarly all attributes and their knowledge are valid
only at the vyAvahArika level and, other than Brahman,
nothing else is fundamental and eternal. Hence, the
objection that jAti is being compromised by admitting
simultaneously both mediate and immediate knowledge
has no relevance. In fact, if we examine closely it
is not the same knowledge that is simultaneously categorized
as mediate and immediate knowledge. If we make the statement
'that is fragrant piece of sandal wood' upon seeing the
wood, the fact that it is fragrant comes from memory.
Hence, the immediate part of knowledge and mediate part
of knowledge are different. Hence both mediate and immediate
knowledge do not corresponds to the same attributive
knowledge, so there is no contradiction. They correspond
to two different sense inputs which do not overlap.
In a statement 'the hill is on fire', the mental states
or vRRitti-s are different for the hill and for the
fire. The hill is directly and immediately perceived;
the fire is not directly and immediately cognized. Fire
is inferred since we can see smoke on the hill, since
there cannot be smoke without a fire. We therefore conclude
that the hill is on fire. Knowledge of fire is deduced
based on the perceptual knowledge of both the hill and
the smoke. The vRRitti-s associated with hill and smoke
have their attributes grasped by the senses. Hence cognition
of hill and smoke is direct and immediate. The mind
has to go through the process of deductive reasoning
to arrive at the conclusion that the hill is on fire.
This vRRitti is different from that of hill or smoke.
For the fire vRRitti, there are no corresponding attributes
of fire, since there is no sense data for the fire on
the hill. The knowledge that the hill is on fire is
therefore only mediate and indirect.
Hence there is no contradiction involved with respect
to mediate and immediate knowledge occurring simultaneously
regarding the same limiting consciousness. In fact,
knowledge of the fire could be debatable, since it is
a deductive knowledge, which can be faulty if the vyApti
(relation between cause and effect) is defective. That
is, if the logic is not fool proof, the deduction (that
hill is on fire) based on the observed perceived fact
(hill and smoke) could be erroneous. There are many
theories in science which were proved wrong by subsequent
data. Hence, not only do we have valid knowledge about
the presence of hill and smoke but also the possibility
of invalid knowledge of fire if the vyApti (related
to smoke and fire) is not fully established.
With this example, VP summarizes the criterion for
perceptual knowledge:
Perceptual knowledge which is direct and immediate
occurs when the vRRitti or mental mood arises in the
form of an object. i.e. in the form containing all the
attributes of the object, thus establishing one to one
correspondence between the object and the vRRitti formed.
This ensures that the limiting consciousness (existence)
in the form of the object coincides with the limiting
consciousness in the form of vRRitti in the mind. In
both the object and the vRRitti - two things are the
same. Firstly, the substantive that is the existence
is the same in both vRRitti and object (it could manifest
also as reflected consciousness in the vRRitti since
the vRRitti is part of the mind which, as subtle matter,
can reflect consciousness much better than the inert
object outside). Secondly, the attributes are also the
same in both the object and the vRRitti to the degree
that the senses are able to measure. Hence, as long
as the attributes are measurable by the appropriate
senses and to the degree they are measured, the vRRitti
of the object is formed. The vRRitti thus formed is
immediately illumined as it forms and the reflected
consciousness reveals the object to the subject, ensuring
the direct and immediate perceptual knowledge of the
object.
Proceed to the next
essay. |
