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Part XV - Question related to jAti
[form]
In the example of 'this is a fragrant piece of a sandal
wood', there is mixture of both immediate and direct,
as well as mediate and indirect knowledge. This is considered
in nyAya philosophy as defective and is called saMkara – the
confusion of two diagonally opposite entities - direct
and immediate on one side and indirect and mediate on
the other. Hence the next objection is based on position
of nyAya philosophy.
Q. If we admit the cross between immediate knowledge
and mediate knowledge as in the example above then we
have problem of discarding or rejecting jAti or genus
as a distinct category.
The objection is based on the
philosophical position of nyAya which admits jAti
as a fundamental and eternal category which does not
allow co-existence of mutually opposite characteristics
- in our case immediate on one side and mediate on
the other, related to objective knowledge. We discussed
jAti before in relation to the characteristics of
particular species, as in the example of jAti of ‘cow’ being different from that
of ‘horse’. jAti relates to the generic
characteristics that are common for all cows and which
make a cow a cow and not a horse.
Suppose we find an animal that has some of the cow
characteristics and some of the horse characteristics,
then can it be called cow and horse simultaneously or
neither a cow nor a horse? We are now violating the
jAti-s of both. That is we are putting mutually exclusive
characteristics in one locus, i.e. jAti of cow excludes
jAti of horse. More importantly, we have the problem
of separating cow jAti from horse jAti. If we had animals
that had characteristics of both cow and horse, the
naming of cow jAti separate form horse jAti would become
meaningless. Hence this cross between diagonally opposite
entities makes jAti a non-fundamental and non-eternal
category. There is a problem and hence an objection.
A. A simple answer by a Vedantin is: ‘So What?’ An
advaitin does not admit jAti as a fundamental and eternal
category. He is only concerned about the attributes
and, if they happen to form into a class or jAti, so
be it, but if they do not then there is no violation.
The necessity or requirement for the attributes to fall
into categories (jAti-s) in order for perception to
be valid is the problem. Advaita takes the attributes
as they come – we cannot force them to fall into
categories that we have defined a priori. Hence, if
the objection is that jAti as a fundamental category
is being compromised, the answer is that that is good.
It only goes to show that jAti is not a fundamental,
eternal category. VP says that, in the perception of
an object as 'this is a jar', there is already proof
of the existence of an attribute 'jarhood' which makes
a jar a jar and not a flower vase. We have no preset ‘jarhood’ category
in which all jars have to belong. There is no requirement
that, in order for the perception to be valid, there
has also to be some generic attribute for it to be a
jar. Hence, generic attribute as an entity itself is
fictitious. Not only can such a generic attribute not
be perceived, it cannot be inferred either.
Proceed to the next
essay. |
