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Part XXXXII -
Analysis of error - Part 3: naiyAyika objection
So, what is the ontological status of the silver that
I saw instead of the nacre? It seems that we actually
experienced the silver and therefore it cannot be totally
unreal, and yet we later discovered that it was not
really there. It is similar to experiencing a snake
instead of the real rope. If the snake and the silver
that we experienced came under the category of vyAvahArika
satyam, then they should be transactionally experiencable
(vyavahAra effectively means transaction). What happed
to the silver when I picked up the object and discovered
that it was nacre? Should I say that it disappeared?
It is like the snake ‘disappearing’ when
I find that it is a rope. Where did the snake go, when
I found out that it was a rope? Of course, we know that
the snake was never there other than in the mind of
the perceiver. However, the experience of the perceiver
is not like that. He would not say that the snake or
silver was only in his mind (at the time that he seemingly
perceives them). For him, the perceptions (though subsequently
found to be mistaken) seem perfectly real. One can say
it is like prAtibhAsika, a mental projection of an object.
But that word – prAtibhAsika – is normally
reserved for those objects created by mental projection,
as in the dream state. Since we see the silver ‘out
there’ where the nacre is, it is not like the
inner mental projection of dream objects. In the case
of dream objects, which we call purely prAtibhAsika,
both the seer and the seen are in the mind only. But
here, when I say there is a snake or there is silver,
the object is perceived as external to the mind through
perceptual knowledge.
Because of that reason only, I was motivated to go
and try to pick up the object, since silver is of value
to me. If it is external, then it cannot disappear into
thin air. This is the fundamental problem with all mithyA
objects, which are neither real nor unreal. Hence advaita
vedAnta uses the term anirvachanIya, inexplicable, since
characterization of the silver or snake as either prAtibhAsika
or vyAvahArika causes a problem. Ontologically, the
status of silver is different from nacre, since the
latter is considered to be real (or at least more real
than the silver). The silver cannot ‘disappear’ because
there is no silver substantive there. But even without
the substantive silver, I could still perceive silver
because the perception is based on the attributive content.
The senses picked up the silvery-ness of the object
by virtue of its shining and, based on this attributive
content of the vRRitti, it was concluded that the object
was silver. Then, when I later picked up the object,
the other attributes corresponding to nacre were grasped
by the senses and I was able to negate the prior perception
of silver as error.
Now we address some of the issues that were raised
and answered in the form of objections in VP.
Objection (by tArkika-s): Yes. As
a result of bending down, picking up the object and
observing it, one recognizes that it is nacre and not
silver. Thus, the knowledge that was gained before (that
it was silver) is falsified. Up to this point, we also
agree. However, how can one prove that the silver that
was seen before falsification was not due to a real
silver object seen in the past at some other time and
place? How can you see silver now, if you have not seen
silver before at some other time? The silver that you
saw before must have been real silver, not false. When
you are actually looking at the nacre, you are seeing
that real silver which existed before at some other
place and time. Hence, the error is in the mistaken
identity of that real silver perceived somewhere else
and now being perceiving here instead of the nacre.
Therefore the error is anyathA khyAti (see Part 40).
As we can easily explain the error, there is nothing
inexplicable or anirvachanIya about it. Both the nacre,
and the silver that we saw before, are real. The error
arose only because of the confusion in the mind caused
by associating the past real silver with the present
real nacre. We believe that this association occurs
because of some extraordinary relationship at knowledge
level (j~nAna-lakShaNa-sannikarSha) between the nacre-knowledge
and the silver-knowledge. It is similar to seeing sandal
wood in the distance and concluding that it is fragrant
sandal wood, although one is only seeing the sandal
wood and not able to smell anything from a distance.
The association of fragrance with the sandal wood comes
about as a result of the memory of the previous knowledge
that sandal wood is usually fragrant.
Response: Not so. One cannot postulate a
silver from the past for perception in the present, unassociated
with current sense input. Perception is direct and immediate
because it involves sensory input from the object that is
directly in front of one, not remote in the memory. The attribute
of silvery-ness is seen directly here and now, as one sees
the object. This is direct sense input. When the vRRitti
is formed, based upon the attributive content, the perception
that the object is silver is based upon the silvery-ness
noted by the organ of vision. Only when we tried to pick
up the object, did we discover that a substantive silver
was not found in the object, negating the validity of the
silver-perception. Silvery-ness is still noted in the object
nacre but, along with that silvery-ness which is superficial
and insubstantial, other attributes belonging to nacre are
also perceived, and these give new direct and immediate knowledge
that the object is nacre and not silver.
When the perception that ‘this is silver’ occurred,
because of the direct sense-input of the silvery-ness of the
object, the perception was direct and immediate. We do not
agree with the naiyAyika position that the attributes of the
silver seen in the current object are based on the perception
of silver at some other time and place. If, without direct
sense input in the present, one can perceive the silver object
based upon knowledge from some other time and place then, by
extension of this logic, we could perceive fire directly and
immediately just by seeing smoke, without having any sense
input of fire attributes. That makes inference as well as other
means of knowledge redundant as separate pramANa-s.
The naiyAyika now questions the validity of direct perception
of silver claimed by the advaitin. The question again boils
down to substantive vs. attributive knowledge.
Objection: In the absence of any substantive
parts of the silver in nacre, how is it possible for one
to say ‘this is silver’ and that the perception
of silver is direct and immediate? How is silver produced
in the nacre, where there is no silver whatsoever? How can
one say that silver is directly and immediately perceived
without any silver being present in the object? Silver has
to come from the past knowledge only.
Response: Normally, for complete perceptual
knowledge of an object, all the asAdhAraNa or specific
attributes are required. This will then uniquely identify
an object as ‘this’ and ‘not that’.
Some objects may have one or two unique or specific outstanding
attributes that make it stand out for identification. The
shining aspect of silvery-ness is a striking identification
for all silver objects to the extent that anything that is
shining like silver is immediately taken as silver, unless
it is proved to be otherwise by subsequent observation. Similarly,
a striking yellow gold color is a dominant attribute to cognize
an object as gold and not silver. It could be a silver-plated
object with very little substantiality of silver or a gold-plated
object with very little substantiality of gold. But, based
upon the dominant attributes that the sense of vision perceives,
the vRRitti that is formed contains that attribute for immediate
identification of an object as silver or gold, etc. These errors
are therefore possible since knowledge is attributive and not
substantive. Existence of parts of silver is not necessary
as long as the objects shines like silver for one to perceive
it as silvery object. Artificial diamonds may be perceived
as real ones, except by a trained eye.
Thus, when the silvery shining of nacre is seen from a distance,
due to the presence of that dominant attribute and our lack
of observation of any specific attributes of nacre, the vRRitti
that is formed immediately has the dominant attribute of the ‘silvery
shining’ aspect of the object perceived and, when the
knowledge of the vRRitti arises due to the usual process discussed
before, cognition of the object silver and knowledge of that
cognition occur.
Proceed to the next
essay.
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