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        Part XXXIV- 
Re-examination of the Perceptual Process (based upon some questions
         raised on the previous material) – Part 3  
       I will next address some epistemological issues that
         have been raised. I will paraphrase the questions raised
         in relation to the above description of attributive
         knowledge of an object. Some of the objections have
         already been addressed but they are being repeated in
         order to focus on the issues involved.  
       1. Objection: That the mind gains
         only attributive and not substantial knowledge from
         the vRRitti is similar to the philosophy of vij~nAna
         vAda of Buddhism and to Western Idealism. For them also
         there are no objects out there. That object knowledge
         is only attributive knowledge counts against Vedanta. 
                  Response: Absolutely not.
         There is a difference between attributive-object knowledge
             and vij~nAna vAda or Western Idealism. When the
         senses gather attributes from a perceived object, those
         attributes are not created by the seer or his mind.
         There is an objective or empirical reality or vyAvahArika
         satyam. The objects, together with their attributes,
         are the creation of Ishvara. The jIva’s creation manifests
             only in dream states, whereas Ishvara’s creation
             is in the waking state. According to Advaita Vedanta,
             Ishvara himself became many (bahusyam - let me become
             many). The different objects, and the divergent attributes
             that distinguish them, stem from a creation that is
             based upon previous karma. Each object is an assemblage
             of the basic elements, the pa~ncha bhUta-s, the five
             primordial elements that come from Ishvara. Ishvara’s
             creation includes the minds of those beings that
             perceive the objects through their senses. The minds,
             the objects they perceive, and the attributive knowledge
             of the objects gained through the senses and mind,
             are ontologically in par. The only difference is
             that the mind is made up subtle elements while the
             objects are made with gross elements. This is one
             of the reasons why physical objects do not enter
          into the mind. 
        2. Objection: How do we know that
         the senses bring in only attributes and not the substance,
         since substance and attributes are inseparable? 
                  Response: It is well known
         that when I see an object, the image of the object is
         formed on the retina and this image is then transmitted
         as an electrical signal to the brain. The projection
             of 3-D forms occurs because of the presence of two
             eyes. The object remains outside while the image
         is formed on the retina and transmitted to the brain.
             This is where physics ends. The electrical input
         is transformed (though how is not yet understood) into
             what Vedanta calls a vRRitti in the mind. Hence,
         only those attributes that can be measured by the senses
             are fed into the brain and thence to the mind. The
             mind being subtle and the object being gross, it
         is just as well that the substance does not enter into
             the brain and therefore into the mind! These are
         facts that we understand so far. 
             
            3. Objection: Form and color are
             not the only attributes. There are other sense inputs:
             shabda, sparsha, rasa, gandha, etc. Image formation
             is only at the optical level. Hence, the above explanation
             is not valid. 
       Response: The optical signal processing
         is very clear and is faster than the processing of other
         signals. All sense-inputs are transferred via electrical
         inputs to the brain. If the nervous system fails, then
         electrical signal input fails and the input from the
         corresponding senses also fails. If all senses fail,
         no knowledge of the external world occurs. These are
         facts that we know. There are no assumptions involved
         here. Having more than one type of attribute does not
         make the process any different. All signal processing
         is the same. There may be parallel processing instead
         of series processing, i.e. simultaneous information
         feed rather than sequential feed. However, at the vRRitti
         level, the thought in the mind appears to be sequential
         not parallel. One does not have two simultaneous thoughts.  
     
  4. Objection: The mind is not a two dimensional
  screen for projection, as the analysis implies. 
     
    Response: The analysis does not assume that
    the mind is a two-dimensional screen. Virtual images of 3-D
    can be made easily and can be seen. Conceptually, the process
    is the same. The above analysis is valid even if one considers
    the mind to be 3-D or even multi-dimensional. The mind remains
    subtle even if it is multi-dimensional, while the matter
    outside is gross. According to Vedanta, the mind is a part
    of the subtle body, which is formed by the subtle elements
    before pa~nchIkaraNam [literally causing anything to contain
    the five elements]. The matter (bhautika) outside is gross
    and formed after pa~nchIkaraNam. The objects are made up
    of gross matter and their attributes are subtle. Sensory
    communication takes place via transmitted, coded signals.
    The senses form part of the subtle body.  
     
  5. Objection: An object is not just a substance.
  It has attributes which may differ from the attributes of the
  substance of which it is made. For example, a ring is different
  from gold, the material substance. When VP says that an object ‘ring’ is
  perceived, the ring object that is perceived by the mind does
  not necessarily have only the attributes of the ring itself. 
       Response: No. The substance is in
         the form of an object, where form constitutes an attribute
         of the object along with other attributes. The object
         itself is notional, since it is the material or substantive
         itself in that form. When attributes are perceived,
         a locus is formed for the attributes and that locus
         is the vRRitti in the mind. That vRRitti is the ‘object
         ring’ that is perceived. The ‘object ring’ that
         is perceived is as real as the mind that perceives it.
         Within vyavahAra, ontologically both are equally real
         or equally unreal, depending on one’s vision or
         understanding.  
       Proceed to the next
        essay. 
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