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Part XIV - Some Clarifications
Regarding Character
Q.What about merits and demerits,
dharma or adharma, righteous and unrighteous? One’s basic character
may be righteous or unrighteous but one may become consciously
aware of it only as the result of another's verbal testimony
or by the pleasant or unpleasant situations that result
in one’s life as a consequence. In such cases,
the verbal testimony of others occurs at times and places
which are different from those of the acts of righteousness
or unrighteousness themselves. Similarly, the good or
bad consequences will be at different times and places.
Thus, in respect of the mental moods of righteousness
and unrighteousness and the verbal testimony or the
good or bad consequences, there is a unity in the limiting
consciousnesses of the past and present since one become
conscious of the former only as a result of the latter.
The requirement of perception is being fulfilled – i.e.
the requirement for the unity in the limiting consciousnesses
- yet there is no direct and immediate perception of
righteousness or unrighteousness. Hence the objection
is that the requirement for the unity of limiting consciousnesses
is not sufficient for perceptual knowledge or is unduly
extensive for perceptual knowledge.
Note: The question involves extending the concept of perception
to abstract ideas or 'objects' whose attributes are not
well defined, but are normally known through Agama pramANa
or shabda pramANa or through established moral codes of
conduct. They are not tangible, like objects, or experienced,
like emotions. That righteousness or unrighteousness form
mental moods needs to be established first before one
inquires into the unity of limiting consciousness of these
with that of verbal testimony or the good and bad consequences.
A. VP answers by defining perception more clearly. For perception,
the object perceived must have attributes that qualify the
object. We stated earlier that all objective knowledge is attributive
knowledge and this is now formulated on firmer grounds. Those
attributes must be perceptible either through the senses or
through the mind. Even if one considers that ‘righteousness’ and ‘unrighteousness’ are
attributes of the mind, they are not perceptible. They can
be known only though their effects or by verbal testimony.
VP says that some attributes are perceptible and some others
are not and that this depends on the intrinsic nature of the
object they qualify. For example, we learn in Chemistry that
water is a colorless, odorless, tasteless, liquid. These are
actually non-perceptible attributes that do not identify what
water is but identify what is not water. Vedanta uses similar
language in indicating Brahman, starting from imperceptible,
infinite, non-dual, unthinkable, etc. The nyAya system of philosophy
considers righteousness and unrighteousness to be attributes
of the self, similar to happiness. In Advaita, Self has no
attributes, and happiness is not an attribute of the self but
is its intrinsic nature, which is limitless. Limitlessness
is happiness: anantam eva anandam.
However, verbal testimony can lead to direct perceptual
knowledge in certain cases, says VP, if the object that
is being indicated is right here being experienced.
For example, when one is happy and if another says,
'you are happy', the knowledge arising from the verbal
statement coincides with the knowledge of the mental
mood that is present. This becomes clearer in the example
of the missing tenth man story, where the verbal testimony
can lead to direct perceptual knowledge of the tenth
man, who is experienced right there. Ten people crossed
the river and, when they reached the other side, each
one counted to make sure that everyone in the group
has crossed safely. Each one came up with only nine
when he counted, and concluded that one had been lost.
A wise man came to their rescue and asked them to count
again and when the counting stopped at nine, the wise
man said - 'you are the tenth man' - Thus although all
the ten were there, each one omitted to count himself
and therefore came up one short. Here the verbal statement – ‘you
are the tenth man’ - immediately and directly
leads to perceptual knowledge, since the object that
is pointed out is right there and immediately accessible
ether to the senses or to the mind. Hence, verbal testimony
can lead to direct and immediate perceptual knowledge
if the object of perception is directly and immediately
perceptible.
We discussed earlier the composite perceptual and inferential
knowledge involved in knowledge such as ‘there
is fire on the distant hill’. The hill and the
smoke are directly perceived by the senses, while the
fire is inferred using logic of the cause (hetu) and
effect (sAdhya) relationship (vyApti j~nAnam). ‘The
hill is on fire’ is an inferential knowledge while ‘the
hill’ and ‘the smoke’ are direct perceptual
knowledge. Thus there is a combination of mediate and
immediate knowledge.
In many instances the inferential knowledge is based
partly on perception. Take the example of a statement
after seeing a piece of sandal wood from a distance:
'that is a fragrant piece of Sandal wood'. In this statement,
what is perceived is only the sandal wood and based
on prior experience one is making the statement that
the sandal wood has fragrance, although the fragrance
is currently not perceived by the nose. Here we have
both immediate knowledge – the perception of the
sandal wood – and mediate knowledge. That it is
fragrant is based on previous memory involving experience
of the connecting link - sandal wood and its fragrance.
Thus, we know from past experiences that if it is sandal
wood, then it must have fragrance; i.e. the concomitant
relation between sandal wood and its fragrance has already
been established by past experiences. If one never had
that experience, then he cannot make the statement 'that
is a fragrant piece of sandal wood'; all he can say
is 'that is a piece of sandal wood'. If he does not
know what sandal wood looks like, then all he can say
is: 'that is a piece of wood'.
[Note that VP makes a distinction here of imperceptible
attributes, which are different from the above case
where the fragrance is not perceptible. In this case,
the fragrance is not perceived not because it is imperceptible
but because the object is too far away for the olfactory
knowledge to take place. In contrast there are certain
genuinely imperceptible attributes. This is the case
when when they are beyond the capability of the instruments
of perception. E.g. eyes can see only the visible spectrum;
X-rays can never be seen by the eyes, they are truly
imperceptible.]
Proceed to the next
essay. |
