|
Part XVI - Relation between an attribute and its substantive
At this juncture VP addresses another philosophical
aspect that concerns the relation between attribute
and its substantive. Here I am providing some background,
although this will be discussed in detail later.
Suppose we say: this is a blue lotus. The general
understanding is that ‘blue’ is an attribute
or visheShaNa and lotus is the ‘substantive’ or
visheShya. A question is posed in philosophy: how is
the attribute, blue, related to its substantive, lotus?
The first assertion is that they are inseparable. I
cannot remove ‘blue’ from the lotus. In
the case of two separate objects, the relation between
the attribute and the substantive is called saMyoga
- that is temporarily joining together things which
are separable. For example, consider a 'book on the
table'. ‘Table’ qualifies the book since
the book on the table is different from the book on
the floor. In this case, ‘book’ qualifies
the table too, since the table with a book on it may
be compared to another table without a book on it. Book
and table are said to have samAna adhikaraNa - each
equally qualifies the other and they are therefore separable.
saMyoga brings two dravya-s or substantives together.
These are called incidental qualifications or taTastha
lakShaNa.
However, when we talk about the blue lotus, I cannot
remove the blue color from the lotus. In addition, blue
cannot exist without a locus for its existence, while
lotus can exist without being blue (although we couldn’t
then call it a blue lotus). Hence, in order for a blue
lotus to be a blue lotus, the two have to be inseparable.
Also, blue is not the same as lotus and lotus is not
the same as blueness. Although they are mutually exclusive,
one depends on the other and they remain inseparable.
How are the two related? I.e. how is blue connected
to the lotus, since they are two distinct entities?
(We are using the term 'entity' loosely, since blue
cannot be a substantive of its own and always needs
a locus. That is blue color cannot exist separately
without being associated with some noun or substantive
like blue powder, blue pencil, blue car, blue sky, etc.
One is a dependent entity while the other is independent
entity.)
According to nyAya vaisheShika or tArkika-s (Indian
logicians), the two (the inseparable but distinct attribute
and substantive) are related by what they call samavAya,
meaning ‘inherence’. The blue color is inherent
in the blue lotus since they are inseparable. Like jAti
that we discussed above, this 'inherence' or samavAya
is considered by logicians as a fundamental, eternal
relation relating visheShaNa and visheShya or attribute
and its locus. Other philosophers criticize this concept
heavily using dialectic arguments. The normal objection
is that bringing a separate relation to relate attribute
and substantive would result in infinite regress, since
we would need to bring in another samavAya to relate
this samavAya relation, and so on, while the naiyAyika-s
claim that we do not need another samavAya to relate
samavAya.
Then how do the other philosophies address this relation
between attribute and its noun or substantive? VishiShTAdvaita
contends that there is no need to have a separate relation
to relate the two, since they are inseparable – and
that is how they are related. They call it apRRithak
siddhi, which essentially means ‘inseparable relationship’.
Actually this is not saying much other than stating
the fact. But the problem comes if we ask a more pertinent
question: what is a lotus or how does one define a lotus?
A ‘blue lotus’ can be defined a lotus with
a blue color. However, the term ‘blue’ becomes
relevant only if there are other lotuses that are not
blue. If there is no other lotus that has a color different
from blue, then calling it ‘blue’ lotus
is unnecessary, like calling my daughter my ‘first
daughter’ when I have only one daughter. The definition
of any object should be such that it distinguishes it
uniquely from all other objects in the world. All definitions
are only attributive in the sense we define an object
using its attributes. This implies that, without those
distinguishing attributes, one cannot define an object
uniquely in such a way as to separate it from others.
Here we arrive at attributes that are svAbhAvika or ‘inherent’;
i.e. attributes that are inherent with the object in
contrast to taTastha lakShaNa-s, which are incidental
attributes, like ‘book on the table’ etc.
These inherent attributes cannot be separated from the
object that they define. Even in these inherent attributes,
svAbhAvika, we can make further distinctions: those
that are necessary and those that are necessary and
sufficient. This can be illustrated by taking the example
of sugar. We know that sugar is sweet; the ‘sweetness’ is
its attribute. Hence sweetness is its inherent qualification
or svAbhAvika lakShaNa. It is also a necessary qualification
since, if it is not sweet, it cannot be sugar even if
it looks like sugar. Yet sweetness is a necessary but
not sufficient qualification to define sugar, since
many other things are also sweet.
To qualify it as both a necessary and sufficient qualification,
it has to satisfy a converse statement. The converse
of 'sugar is sweet' is 'sweet is sugar'. The converse
statement states that if something is sweet, it has
to be sugar. If that is applicable at all times, then
sweetness becomes both a necessary and sufficient qualification
to define sugar. The necessary and sufficient qualification
is called svarUpa lakShaNa. svarUpa lakShaNa forms a
very rigorous definition for any object to differentiate
that object uniquely from the rest of the objects in
the universe. We find that sweetness is not a svarUpa
lakShaNa for sugar, since if something is sweet it could
be many other things as well, besides sugar - like glucose,
fructose, aspartame, etc. Hence sweetness is not a svarUpa
lakShaNa although it is svAbhAvika lakShaNa.
Then what is the svarUpa lakShaNa of sugar? According
to Chemistry, the unique definition of sugar or sucrose
is C 12H 22O 11 - the chemical structure, perhaps to
be written in correct format to distinguish it from
its isomers. Sugar is C 12H 22O 11 and C 12H 22O 11
is sugar, and there are no two ways about it. It is
the necessary and sufficient condition to qualify as
svarUpa lakShaNa of sugar. svarUpa also means its intrinsic
structure and, in the case of sugar, its chemical structure
rightly defines it as svarUpa. In fact in any chemical
analysis, if an unknown compound is given, chemists
arrive its chemical structure or svarUpa lakShaNa by
evaluating all its physical and chemical properties
along with its molecular weight. Once the structure
is determined, all its intrinsic qualities are known.
To recapitulate again, the svarUpa lakShaNa is determined
by applying a converse statement - In the case of the
sugar example the direct statement is 'sugar is C 12H
22O 11’ and the converse statement is ‘C
12H 22O 11 is sugar'. Similarly, H 2O is water, NH 3
is ammonia, etc.
Looking at svarUpa lakShaNa or intrinsic structure,
it is also clear now that every object is made up of
components arranged in a particular order. In the case
of sugar, the components are Hydrogen, Carbon, and Oxygen.
Further examination reveals that each one of them is
again made up of smaller components but arranged again
in some fixed order. For example, the constituents of
sugar, carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen are electrons, protons
and neutrons, but organized in a particular order. This
is true for any object. Since each object is divisible
into finer components and each component has its own
svarUpa lakShaNa - it implies that every object is only
relevant with its intrinsic structure until further
divided into its constituent objects. Hence
no object is final or, in philosophical terms, ‘absolutely
real’. They only have validity in their sphere
of application or transaction. The relative realities
are called vyAvahArika satyam or transactional reality.
Proceed to the next
essay. |
