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Part XXXIII -
Re-examination of the Perceptual Process (based upon some questions
raised on the previous material) – Part 2
Objection: Perceptual knowledge pertains to vyavahAra.
The above discussion transgresses to pAramArthika. In
vyavahAra the objects are real. Hence, a ring is real,
as an object. VP says that, when we perceive an object
ring, we perceive both the object ring and its attributes.
That it is made up of gold is not important here in
respect of the perception of the ring as an object.
For the pAramArthika view, shabda is pramANa and this
is discussed separately in VP.
Response: Initially, these comments appear to be valid but we
need to go a little deeper in order to unravel the truth. Even
at the empirical level (vyavahAra), there is no object ring other
than form, color and the other attributes that can be perceived.
This is precisely the reason why the Upanishads utilize laukika
or vyAvahArika examples and not alaukika ones to illustrate the
fact that it is the material cause itself which is the products
in a variety of forms. Here, scripture is not a pramANa for the
illustration that the product is the cause itself in a different
form. Scripture is using a vyAvahArika example to prove the point,
which it later extends to pAramArthika. It proves the point using
examples to show that there are no separate objects apart from
rUpa, form and nAma, name. rUpa provides the attributive set
and nAma constitutes the knowledge of its existence, since a
name can only be given when there is knowledge. (As we said before,
existence of an object is established by the knowledge of its
existence.)
Hence, objects are nothing but the material cause itself
in different forms. By knowing the material cause, one
knows all the objects formed out of that material. Hence
ring, bangle, necklace, bracelet are ‘as well
known’ since we have AdhAra j~nAnam [knowledge
of the substratum]. We will have Adheya j~nAnam, when
we perceive through the senses the attributes of the
object, ring, which are different from the attributes
of the bangle, etc. Only after establishing the facts
at the experiential level, does the Upanishad enter
into a discussion of the cosmic level to apply the same
logic – knowing the material cause for the whole
universe, one knows essentially all the objects in the
world. Hence, from the point of view of perception also,
there is no object or objects other than the material
cause and the attributive aspects of the products which
differentiate one object from another, e.g. ring from
bangle.
Question: In the gold ring example, do we perceive
the substance at any time? How do we know that it is
a gold ring and not an iron ring if we do not perceive
the substantive?
Answer: In these vyAvahArika examples, the substantives of
the two rings are different in the sense that they have their
own attributes that distinguish them as separate. Hence the
senses, when gathering the attributes of the ring, also gather
the attributes of the substantive too, since the substantives
have their own attributes. Thus, ‘gold attributes’ are
different from ‘iron attributes’. The locus of
these attributes is the ‘matter gold’ or the ‘matter
iron’. The ‘matter’ is an assemblage of electron-proton-neutrons
and with atoms arranged in a crystal lattice (gold is ‘face-centered
cubic’ and iron is ‘body-centered cubic’ for
those who are interested). Again, the senses gather those attributes
that they can measure. By using more sophisticated instruments
such as the electron microscope, one can increase the sensitivity
of the senses.
If the iron happens to be gold plated, then the iron
ring would be indistinguishable from a pure gold ring.
The senses, when they measure external attributes such
as luster etc, may not be able to distinguish the gold
from gold-plated iron and will conclude that both rings
are golden-rings. This further illustrates the point
that senses can only bring in the attributes and not
the substantive.
After discussing such worldly examples, the scripture then
goes to the pAramArthika or absolute level to point out that
the substantive for the whole world is only sat or brahman,
which has no attributes that the senses can gather. Hence,
our knowledge of worldly objects is made up of only the attributes
of transactional reality and not absolute reality. Hence, the
scriptures tell us that we must learn about the substantive
of the world (AchAryavan purusho veda) from a teacher who teaches
the scriptures.
To complete the process, the sense input forms a vRRitti in
the mind. A vRRitti can be thought of as an image on the mental
screen consisting of attributes of the object. These begin
with ‘form’, which includes the entire 3-D form
since, as we discussed before, we have two eyes that are seven
degrees apart to provide a stereographic projection. The ‘image’ is
the electrical or neural signal which gets transformed into
the subtler image or vRRitti. That it occurs is definite but
how it occurs is anybody’s guess. The contents of the
vRRitti are the attributive knowledge about the object. Recognition
follows after cognition, by comparing the object perception
with the stored information from the memory bank to see if
the attributive knowledge matches any other object in the memory.
If the memory is damaged, the recognition process can be affected
after the cognitive process is complete. The witnessing consciousness
illumines the vRRitti as it forms in the mind and the reflected
consciousness constitutes the attributive knowledge of the
object ‘out there’. For perception to complete,
VP has discussed the perceptuality requirements that need to
be met.
Proceed to the next
essay.
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