Part II - Introduction Part
         2 
       Before we proceed further let us review some basics.
         First, we should realize that 'knowledge' itself cannot
         be defined. Whenever we say we have knowledge, we only
         refer to 'knowledge of things and beings' or to be more
         accurately, objective knowledge; in simple terms knowledge
         of 'this'. The knowledge with which we are familiar
         is always ‘knowledge of’… all objective
         knowledge. And all objective knowledge is qualified
         knowledge – chemistry-knowledge, physics-knowledge,
         knowledge of 'this' or 'that', etc. We do not know if
         there is such a thing as pure 'unqualified knowledge'.
         If I knew, I could not even say that I had the knowledge
         of 'that', since the very 'that' would qualify the unqualifiable.
         Therefore I would have to remain silent or communicate
         in words that take one to that silence.  
       When we say that we have knowledge of something, what
         we mean is that we are aware of that something or we
         are conscious of it. Hence 'knowledge of' is the same
         thing as being 'conscious of'. Pure knowledge, then,
         is pure consciousness – and here we mean 'objectless
         awareness', since any objective knowledge is a qualified
         knowledge. In the pitch darkness example, we said that
         I am aware of not only the darkness, but myself too.
         I know myself as an existent and conscious entity. I
         never need to search for myself at anytime, since I
         have to be there even to search.  
       Since a subject is never an object, objectless awareness
         is the same thing as self-awareness. Hence, pure knowledge,
         self-awareness and self-consciousness all mean the same
         thing. Pure Knowledge cannot be defined since it is
         the same as the self-knowledge or consciousness that
         I am. Besides, all definitions belong to the realm of
         objects. Two things cannot be defined, since they are
         not objects. First there is Braham since, being infinite,
         it cannot be defined to differentiate it from the rest
         of the objects in the world. There cannot be anything
         other than Brahman if Brahman is still to be Brahman
         (infiniteness). The second thing that cannot be defined
         is the subject, myself. Since I am not an object, I
         cannot be defined. We just mentioned that pure knowledge
         also cannot be defined. In fact, we arrive at the fundamental
         equation of Vedanta that advaita emphasizes: Brahman
         and I am are identically the same, since the essential
         nature of both is the same. In addition, that Brahman
         that I am is also the same as unqualified pure knowledge.
         'I am', therefore, is of the nature of pure knowledge
         and knowledge of an object therefore involves illumination
         of the object by the light of the consciousness that
         I am.  
       In the above dark room example, we cannot have knowledge
         of the objects in the room unless an external light
         illumines them. According to Vedanta, that is not sufficient.
         For me to gain knowledge of an object that is lighted
         in the room, several other things are also needed. First
         and foremost is that the sense organs should have adequate
         capacity to 'grasp' the objects. (Or appropriate tools
         , such as microscopes or telescopes, etc are required
         to augment the capacity of the sense organs to 'grasp'
         them.) This applies to objects that are ‘outside’ ,
         i.e. outside the mind. We can know objects that are
         'inside' the mind by a process of re-collection, since
         we have 'collected' that knowledge already and it is
         stored in the memory. Secondly, to know an object we
         need an appropriate means to know. The ‘means
         of knowledge’ or appropriate tool to know is called
         'pramANa', where 'pramA' means ‘knowledge’ or
         more accurately ‘valid knowledge’. The tool
         to be used depends on the nature of the object that
         is to be known. To see forms and colors, eyes are needed;
         to hear sounds, ears, etc. Eyes cannot hear and ears
         cannot see; each sense organ has its field of knowledge
         specified. Thus each pramANa or means of knowledge is
         very specific in its field of operation.  
       Besides the sense organs, we also need the mind to
         collect the information from the senses. And the mind
         is useless without consciousness to enliven it, making
         the mind conscious of the world of objects. Thus consciousness
         operates similar to the light that illumines objects
         in order to reveal them. Thus it is called the ‘light
         of consciousness’.  
       Thus, we have the sequence:- the senses grasp the object
         which is lighted by the outside light; the mind collects
         the sensory input and integrates this into an image
         of the object in the mind; consciousness lights the
         image in order for me to see. The object of knowledge
         is called 'prameya' or known; the knowledge of the object
         is called 'pramiti', and the means that is operating
         for the knowledge to take place is 'pramANa'. Hence
         in any knowledge that is involved we have these three
         (tripuTI) operating. When the knowledge takes place,
         there is obviously a subject who owns that knowledge
         - he is called the knower or 'pramAtRRi'.  
       So far, the analysis seems to be simple for us to understand.
         However, we need to know how exactly this knowledge
         takes place, and in particular, the role of consciousness
         in acquiring the knowledge of an object. In this respect,
         we will follow the understanding of advaitic masters
         in terms of how the epistemological issues were treated
         in the doctrine. Following VP, we provide a formal definition
         of a 'pramANa'.  
       Definition of pramANa 
  pramA karaNam pramANam - that which is an instrument of knowledge
    (pramA). There are many instruments that are helpful to enable
    knowledge to occur. Hence 'pramANa' stands for that which
    is the essential cause or means for the knowledge
    to take place, all other causes being only secondary. If
    we exclude 'recollection from memory’ (which is part
    of stored knowledge from the past), the pramANa is defined
    as 'anadhigata, abAdhitam, arthavishayaka j~nAnatvam - pramANam' – the
    means of knowledge is that which is (a) not known before
    (since recollection is excluded here); (b) non-negatable,
    and (c) objectifiable (arthavishya implies also 'meaningful';
    it may not mean 'useful', although Ramanuja in his definition
    of pramANa includes 'vyavahAra anuguNam' or 'transactability'
    as a qualifier for valid knowledge).  
       If recollection is included, then the pramANa is only
         a (a) 'non-negatable' and (b) objectifiable entity.
         According to the commentator (Swami Madhavananda), 'non-negatable'
         means that it is not negated directly by a contradictory
         experience. E.g. the rope knowledge is contradictory
         to the previous snake knowledge of the same object at
         same place where the rope is. The implication is that,
         if the pramAtRRi (knower) does not have an experience
         that is contradictory to the previous 'knowledge' gained
         (for example that the rope is actually a snake), even
         though that knowledge is erroneous from the point of
         an independent referee, it is still considered as 'valid'
         knowledge for that knower. (I.e. even though it is really
         a rope, the knower nevertheless knows it as a snake
         and that knowledge is valid.) It is important to recognize
         that unlike other philosophers who believe that validation
         is done by an independent 'sAkShi', the validation rests
         with the knower only. If he does not encounter any experience
         that is contradictory to the previous knowledge in his
         life time, then that knowledge stays with him as valid
         knowledge.  
       This non-negatability for valid knowledge brings us
         interesting definitions, a foundation of advaitic doctrine:
         absolute knowledge is defined as that which can never
         be negated or contradicted at any time; advaita defines
         this as ‘real’ (trikAlAbAdhitam satyam).
         Only this can be pure knowledge without any qualifications.
         All objects have qualifications and unqualified knowledge,
         as discussed above, is knowledge of myself or knowledge
         of Brahman. Hence the pure, unqualified, non-negatable,
         absolute knowledge can only be self-knowledge which
         should be the same as Brahman's knowledge, since Vedanta
         defines Brahman as pure consciousness - praj~nAnaM brahma.  
       Non-negatability in the absolute sense corresponds
         to pure knowledge. In the definition of pramANa, non-negatability
         remains valid in the relative sense, even though it
         is negated in the absolute sense. Hence, for example,
         the knowledge 'this is a jar' remains valid within the
         realm of transactional reality (vyAvahArika satyam).
         However, even in the absolute sense, what is negated
         is not the relative knowledge; absolute reality is assumed
         for the relative knowledge. Just as knowledge of the
         pot remains valid at the transactional level, even after
         knowing its substantive is nothing but clay only, all
         knowledge revealed by pramANa remains valid at the transactional
         level, even when one realizes that 'all this is Brahman'
         (sarvaM khalvidam brahma). Objective knowledge or arthaviShayika
         pramANa, by definition, operates only at the transactional
         level. Hence the definition of pramANa is not compromised.
         Next we will deal with the cognition of time. 
       Proceed to the next
         essay.  |