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Part XXXXIX -
Negating false perception
In the example of the perception of silver where there
is only nacre, the error arose due to adventitious defects
or auxiliary causes such as insufficient light, because
of which only the dominant attribute of silveriness
was grasped by the senses. Based on that limited attributive
data, the knowledge of the object that arose was ‘this
is silver’. When that adventitious defect (such
as poor illumination) is removed, the senses are able
to gather more accurate attributive content of the object
so that the mind is now able to perceive it as nacre
and not silver. Therefore, in the knowledge of the true
nature of the object as nacre, the previous knowledge
that ‘this is silver’ is recognized as having
been an error. VP says the object can be seen as it
is, when the adventitious defects during perception
are removed.
Hence, VP ascertains that the silver seen in nacre is the result
of ignorance of the true nature of the object. Expressed differently,
the ignorance of the substantive contributes to the error in
perception, and we have one thing being incorrectly taken for
another – atasmin tat buddhiH. In Vedantic terminology,
this is called adhyAsa.
Thus, there are two levels of ignorance in the case of ignorance
of substantives:
1) Ignorance of Brahman, which is the substantive of
all objects. This might be called ‘general ignorance’,
sAmAnya avidyA, or mUla avidyA, and is fundamental in
all perceptions of objects. Here, both the objects that
are perceived and the mind that perceives them with
the help of consciousness are in the same order of reality.
2) Ignorance of the substantive only. Perception of
silver in place of nacre is due to this second order
ignorance. Here, the substantive in this relative frame
is not Brahman directly but Brahman in the form of nacre.
This ignorance is called visheSha avidyA or ‘specific
ignorance’, as in this example where we do not
know that the object is nacre and mistake it as silver.
When the adventitious defect is removed, the knowledge
that it is silver is sublated with the rise of knowledge
of the relative substantive, nacre.
However, the new perception that it is nacre is also
due to ignorance and that false or mithyA knowledge
can be eliminated only when the substantive of nacre
is known as nothing but Brahman, since at absolute level
there is nothing other than Brahman or pure consciousness.
Nacre is nothing but consciousness limited by the form
of nacre (together with all the other attributes), since
the scripture says there is nothing other than Brahman,
neha nAnAsti kiMchana. At the relative level, the silver
seen in the nacre is due to the secondary ignorance
that is abiding in consciousness limited by nacre. This
means that, at the relative level, the ignorance that
it is ‘nacrey-consciousness’ (i.e. consciousness
in the form of a nacre as in ‘ringly-gold’ or
gold in the form of a ring) contributes to the perception
of ‘silvery-consciousness’ (consciousness
in the form of silver). The relative knowledge will
only eliminate the relative ignorance and not the absolute
ignorance, i.e. the ignorance of Brahman, or ignorance
that the
‘existence-consciousness that I am’ is Brahman).
When I see nacre as nacre, the silver that was seen is nullified,
along with the ignorance of nacre, by the knowledge that the
silver that was seen before is, in fact, only nacre. This knowledge
manifests as ‘there is no silver there’ and ‘the
silver that I saw was indeed nacre only’. The ignorance
of the first kind, that everything is nothing but Brahman,
will only get nullified when knowledge of the substantive Brahman
is gained. Here, the ignorance of the second kind that ‘it
is silver’ gets nullified when the relative knowledge
that ‘it is nacre’ takes place. As was pointed
out above, it is the removal of the adventitious defects which
bring about the knowledge of the relative truth of the object.
It was noted before that the erroneous knowledge that ‘this
is silver’ was formed due to the perception via
sense input of the silveriness of the object. The implication
is that the substantive for the silver
perception in the mind is nothing but limiting consciousness-existence
as sAkshI. However, in the perception of the silver as ‘this
is silver’, there is only knowledge of the mental impression
of ‘this’ and no knowledge of the substantive (consciousness-existence,
sAkshI) of the vRRitti in the mind. The knowledge of the substantive
limiting-existence-consciousness is absent in the perception
of silver where nacre is (i.e. the fundamental avidyA related
to all objects). And the knowledge of the relative substantive
nacre arises only by elimination of the adventitious defect,
such as poor illumination.
We will now address some of the objections raised.
Objection: (This objection is again
from the naiyAyika-s, who consider that the misperception
of silver is due to recollection of real silver existent
somewhere and not perception of non-existent silver
here. Hence the following question is framed from
their perspective.)
If we admit the illusory existence of silver during the time
that nacre appears as silver, there could never be a subsequent
knowledge at any time (past, present or future) that would
entirely negate the illusory silver appearance in the form ‘this
is not silver’ but only in the form, ‘Now,
it is not silver’. It is like saying: ‘Now, after
baking, the jar is not black any more’. I.e. the blackness
of the jar, which existed before, has been removed due to baking.
The blackness of the jar is real until it is removed. Hence,
the existence of ‘black’ before, and its non-existence
after, are of the same order of reality.
The objection is that the negation ‘it is not silver’ can
be made only if the silver that was perceived previously was
real; and now we can dismiss that perception by the statement
that ‘there is no real silver’. The argument is
simple: that there is no silver (or that there is the non-existence
of silver now) can only be counter-positive or opposite to
the statement ‘there was real silver before’. The
non-existence of silver now is real, since it is nacre and
not silver. The objector says that ‘the non-existence
of silver which is real’ can only be counter positive
to or opposite to ‘the existence of real silver before’.
It cannot be counter positive to ‘the existence of imaginary
or illusory silver before’. ‘Illusory existence’ can
be counter positive only to ‘illusory non-existence’.
Similarly ‘real non-existence’ can only be counter
positive to ‘real existence’ and not to ‘illusory
-existence’. The statement ‘it is not silver’
negates only real existence not illusory existence.
Reply: That is not so. Here, when we say ‘it
is not silver’ (when nacre is perceived as nacre), we
are not negating real (at the relative, transactional level
of reality) silver, but only something that was characterized
by the attribute ‘silveriness’. Therefore, non-existence
that is denied by ‘it is not silver’ does not refer
to real (within vyavahAra) silver anywhere, but only to the
false silver that was seen in the object. Thus, false silver
is falsified by the statement ‘this is not silver’ not real silver,
although both have associated silveriness. Technically, the
counterpositive (pratiyogin) or opposite, of this non-existent ‘real-illusory’ silver,
can never exist. If we could say that it exists, this would
imply that ‘illusory silver’ exists, and that would
lead to illusory silver not being illusory!
It is like saying that ‘there is no cloth existing
as a jar’. Here, the ‘jar-hood’ property
is different from ‘cloth-hood’ property.
What is being denied is the false attribute of ‘jar-hood’ in
the cloth. Jar-hood is a distinguishing quality that
is specific to a jar and not to a cloth. Hence, negation
of a false ‘jar-hood’ is always satisfied
by any cloth, since there is never a jar-hood property
in any cloth. Similarly, the negation of silveriness
can always be fulfilled in any nacre. It may look like
silver from a distance but it is never silver even when
I am mistaking it as silver. Hence, it is not denial
of silver in the nacre when I say that it is not silver
after recognizing that it is nacre, but denial of the false silver
that is attributed to the nacre due to an adventitious
defect. Hence, once I know that it is nacre, even if
I see shining attributive silveriness in the nacre,
it will never be mistaken for silver since there is
no ‘silver-hood’ in the nacre at any time.
Proceed to the next
essay.
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