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Part XVIII - Perceptuality of Objects: Definition vindicated (part 1)
Here VP provides the basis for the ‘immediate
and direct’ nature of perception. It defines the ‘perceptuality’ of
an object or an object's immediate perception as “not
being different from the consciousness associated with
the subject”. Essentially the statement says that,
for a subject (knower or pramAta or pramAtRRi) to be
conscious of an object (prameya), the consciousness
associated with the subject cannot be different from
the object that is being perceived. It is a statement
that baffles the intellect at first because we have
learned all along that the subject is different from
the object and can never become an object, and an object
can never become a subject. The subject is a conscious
entity and the object is an unconscious entity.
The statement of VP is carefully worded so as not to
deny the superficial differences while not accepting
any substantial difference between the two. In addition,
the statement actually relates the object perceived
to the subject that perceives it. It says that the consciousness
underlying the subject is not different from the object,
for a perceived object . This understanding comes from
the fundamentals of Advaita. In dRRik dRRishya viveka,
vidyAraNya says:
antardRRgdRRisyayorbhedaM bahischa brahmasargayoH|
AvRRiNotyaparA shaktissA saMsArasya kAraNam|| …. v.15
The difference between the seer (subject) and the seen
(object) in the mind, and the difference between Brahman
and the creation (world) outside, is due to the veiling
power of mAyA. It is this perceived difference, which
is the root cause for all human suffering. mAyA is that
which appears to be there, but is not really there when
one starts inquiring into its nature. Hence, the difference
between the seer and the seen arises due to mAyA and
is therefore only apparent and not real.
The important point here is that VP states this to
be the criterion for perceptuality of an object. The
requirement for perceptuality is going one step beyond
the simple statement that consciousness is the underlying
substantive for everything in the universe, including
the perceiving subject and the perceived object. The
requirement for perceptuality of an object is that the
subject consciousness not be different from the object
perceived. If it is different, the object is non-perceptual.
Now are there any cases where this requirement is not
met? This will be elucidated by VP, in order to justify
the statement, through questions and answers.
Q. When I see a jar, I say, 'I see a jar'. I am the
subject, the seer, and the jar is an object, the seen.
I am different from the jar, in order for me to see.
In fact, whatever I see, I am not that. If that is the
case, how can a jar or any object that I see be the
same as the consciousness that I am, or more accurately,
be one with the limiting reflected consciousness, the
perceiver that I am? The objection is that this equation
of the subject with the object contradicts our experience.
A. Stating that the consciousness of the subject not
be different from the perceived object is not the same
as saying that the subject is identical with the object.
It only means that the perceptual object has no independent
existence apart from the existence of the knower, 'pramAtRRisattA
atirikta sattAkatva abhAvaH, (other than the existence
of the knower, there is no other existence for perceptual
objects)'. I can stretch this statement to relate to
the one I have been making, namely that the existence
of an object is established by the knowledge of its
existence. Here, VP puts it in a slightly different
form: that the perceptuality of an object has no independent
existence apart from the existence of the subject. This
becomes a criterion for all perceptions being immediate
and direct. [If it is not perceptible, does it have
independent existence? - This question is not raised.
But. if it is not perceived by anyone at any time, it
is meaningless to speak of its existing.]
Let us illustrate this with the example of the perception
of a jar. We have discussed this aspect before. It was
stated that Brahman, pure consciousness, is the material
cause for the universe. Existence-consciousness-limitless
is its intrinsic nature. Since Vedanta says that Brahman
is one without a second, there cannot be anything other
than Brahman. From this it follows that all objects
in this universe, without exception, are nothing but
Brahman alone but with different names and forms - just
as all golden ornaments are nothing but gold alone with
different names and forms. Gold remains as gold but
appears as varieties of ornaments, each with its own
attributes that are different from the others. Hence,
all the ornaments are just gold with superimposed, differing
attributes.
As VP clarifies, superimposition (adhyAsa) does not
mean one on top of the other. It is like the ring's
attributes are superimposed on gold to be named as ring
and these attributes differ from those of the bangle
that are superimposed on another piece of gold. Similarly,
Brahman being the substantive of all objects, the differences
between object A and object B are only due to differences
in the superimposed attributes of A and B. Hence, objects
A and B differ only in terms of their attributes and
not in their substantive. Ring differs from bangle only
in terms of the attributes while the substantive for
both remains the same, namely gold. Knowledge of A should
involve discriminative knowledge of A from the other
objects in the universe. Similarly with respect to knowledge
of B. Hence, knowledge of any object (since all objects
have the same substantive) involves only knowledge of
its attributes. The substantive of all objects being
Brahman, it is expressed as existence itself. Hence,
every object is (existence + its attributes). Perception
involves grasping the attributes of the object by the
senses. Existence being all pervading, everything is
in existence only. As discussed before, existence is
not an attribute to be grasped by senses.
So far we have been examining perception from the point
of view of objects. We need to raise the question now
of who is the subject, since the statement of VP is
that the perceptuality of an object involves consciousness
of the subject not being different from that of the
object. When I see the object, I say I am the seer and
the object is seen. But who is this 'I am', the seer
or the knower of the object? Obviously when I say I
am the knower, unlike the object, I have to be a conscious
entity since an unconscious entity cannot see or know.
An object cannot know itself nor establish its existence
by itself. I have to be there to say 'the object is'.
On the other hand, the object does not have to be there
in order to establish my existence. This implies that
my existence, or to be more general the existence of
a conscious entity, is independent of the existence
of the inert object. On the other hand, the inert object's
existence cannot be established independently of the
existence of a knower, a conscious entity. (This logic
is called anvaya-vyatireka and is used to establish
dependent and independent relationships between two
entities, the two entities here being the object and
the knower of the object).
The existence of an object is therefore established
by knowledge of its existence by a knower. Hence, the
VP statement follows: “The perceptuality of an
object depends on its having no independent existence
apart from the existence of the knower of the object.” Based
on our recent discussions, we caution here that the
statement only applies to the perceptuality of the object
and not its independent existence on its own. Whether
it has independent existence or not can never be known
if there is no knower or pramAta to establish its existence
by perception. Can one establish its existence by inference?
By inference one can only establish the possibility
of its existence and not its actual existence. For validation
of an object's existence, inference also rests on perception
though cause-effect relationships or vyApti. If there
is no knower then the existence of the object becomes
indeterminate or anirvachanIya.
Proceed to the next
essay. |
