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Part XXXXVII -
Conclusion of silver-nacre analysis
Objection: Even so, the object identified
as ‘this is silver’ is cognized only when
the perception is directly connected with the witnessing
consciousness, which is nothing but pure ‘I am’,
the consciousness-existence. The vRRitti has to be abiding
in that illuminating consciousness before we can have
knowledge of that vRRitti. That being so, why assume
a state of nescience involving an ‘apparent knowledge’ or ‘mithyA
silver’ as the object of perception and thereby
complicate the issue?
Reply: The perception of an object requires
not only the existence of an object but also consciousness of
the existence of the object. The existence of an object cannot
be established without consciousness of its existence. Hence,
the perception of an object consists in not only having an
existent object but also having that existence united with
the consciousness of the subject (expressing this in the form
of the perceptuality requirement). Hence, any cognition requires
both consciousness and existence as the unifying principle.
But this is precisely the nature of Brahman as its svarUpa
lakshaNam. Yet we do not gain knowledge of Brahman by the perception
of ‘idam’ or ‘this object’, even though
the scripture says that all ‘idam-s’ are Brahman
only. Hence, even though the ‘idam’ or ‘this’ abides
in the consciousness-existence during the perceptual process,
the nescience persists in the perception. Hence, this nescience
is not an assumption but a statement of fact.
Objection: Nevertheless, the mental state
or impression in the form of ‘this’, and the state
of ignorance of ‘Brahman’ due to nescience are
two distinct entities. According to prabhAkara (who was a student
of kumArila bhatta, but formed his own school of pUrva mImAMsA
different from his teacher), one should treat the perception
of the object as ‘this’ and the recognition of
the object as ‘silver’, as two separate processes.
I.e. cognition and recognition are two distinct processes and
should not be combined. However, in the perception of illusory
silver, the perception of ‘this’ is getting mixed
up with the recognition of real silver perceived elsewhere
so that we have a mixed-up perception of ‘this is (that)
silver’. Hence, the illusory silver, according to prabhAkara,
is not an error in perception but an error in recognition.
A qualified perception such as ‘erroneous perception’ is
therefore not permitted and your above analysis violates this.
Reply: Not true. We do not accept prabhAkara’s
analysis of error. In our view, error is taking something other
than what it is – atasmin tat buddhi. Nescience also
involves taking the substantive Brahman as other than what
it is; as an object this or object that. This is fundamental
in all erroneous perceptions. In the example being discussed,
I am taking the object that I am perceiving as ‘this’ as
silver instead of what it actually is – nacre. This error
is at the vyAvahArika level. There is an error at the pAramArthika
level too. But the cause for both errors is the same. One and
the same consciousness is reflected in two states involving
real (the existence as object) and unreal (the experiential ‘this’ as
a form with quality). When the real is not recognized due to
nescience, the unreal is taken to be a real object. This is
admitted as an error in perception. The illuminating consciousness,
sAkshI, illumines the real and the unreal components – ‘this
is’ and ‘silver’. One is the substantive
of ‘is-ness’, and the other the attributive content
of the vRRitti in the form of silveriness. Thus, an error arises
in every perception and is accepted by advaita vedAnta where
the real is ignored, and the Adheya, or superimposed attributive
knowledge forms the basis for the substantive knowledge.
Objection: According to the tenets of vedAnta,
the real silver that is elsewhere (at a different place and
time), yet is observed or experienced, is also the effect of
nescience. In that perception also there is the same superimposition,
or Adheya knowledge of name and form, on the substantive Brahman.
There also the substantive is not recognized as Brahman and
the knowledge is only based on the attributes such as silveriness.
How does the perception of real silver elsewhere differ from
the false silver perceived here, where we mistake nacre as
silver?
Reply: According to NyAya, all are equally
real. However, both experientially as well as according to
advaita vedAnta, even in vyavahAra there are degrees of reality,
even though from the absolute reference point, things are only
transactionally real or vyavahAra satyam. Take, for example,
gold and ring. What should we call ‘real’ and what ‘false’,
when the so-called real is also false from the absolute point
of view? That which remains the same or unchanging during a
transformation is more real than that which is changed. Hence,
of the two – ring and gold – the gold is more real
than the ring.
Transformation of the ring into a bangle will be pariNAma,
in which the cause is destroyed in becoming the effect
but, from the standpoint of the gold, it remains the
same in both cause and effect. Hence, the ontological
status of the gold, as opposed to the ring or bangle,
is different. Similarly, the ontological status of the
silver that was perceived at some other place and time
through a pramANa is real, since it remains as silver
unless a contradictory experience occurs that negates
that knowledge.
In the current example, the object that is first recognized
as silver is subsequently negated by a contradictory
experience. in which the knowledge of the object nacre
occurs. Hence, we have more ‘permanent’ objects
when compared to others, thus establishing a range of
permanence or impermanence and thus defining a degree
of reality of objects. Some objects only have fleeting
presence, while others are more permanent. In the case
of perception of silver where there is nacre, the lighting
conditions may not be adequate for the eyes to see the
complete and full set of attributes that define the
object as nacre. Since silveriness of the object is
dominant and is visible without any doubt, our judgment
is based upon the sense input of the silveriness alone
and silver is immediately perceived. But this perception
is subsequently negated when one gets clear vision or
if one is able to pick up the object. Then one discovers
that it is not silver but nacre.
We need all the necessary attributes in order to be
able to define or identify an object without any ambiguity.
If, for one reason or another, we get only partial but
dominant attributes, then an error in perception is
possible. If there is insufficient light or a defect
in the eye (such as color-blindness), then one can perceive
an object as different from what it is. Thus, the criterion
for errors in perception or for seeing illusory objects
in perception is the perception of an incomplete set
or of incorrect attributes. It is because of this that
the conclusion is made that ‘the object is silver’. Sleep,
for example, can form an adventitious defect for cognition
of the objects in a dream state. Thus, the objects such
as chariot etc experienced in a dream are illusory since
the perception is covered by the adventitious defect called
sleep. They are real as long as the dream lasts, but become
unreal when one wakes up – sa kale satyavat bhAti,
prabhode satyasat bhavati, says Shankara in Atmabodha.
The ontological status of objects seen in dream will be discussed
next.
Proceed to the next
essay.
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