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Part XXXIX -
Erroneous Perceptions
Part 2
In contrast to valid knowledge (pramA), i.e. affirmative
knowledge that is not contradicted by any subsequent
experience, there are two forms of knowledge that are
not affirmative (apramA). One is doubt and the other
is error.
Seeing a tree or the stump of a tree in semidarkness,
the seer may not be sure whether it is a man standing
there or a tree. This is called ‘doubtful knowledge’ – saMshaya.
The doubt could propel the seer to investigate further
to determine the validity of his knowledge; that is,
to find out whether it is a tree that he is seeing or
a man, waiting to attack him! He may acquire the knowledge
from a bystander who can confirm (by Apta vAkyam, literally
a ‘correct sentence’, meaning reported by
a trustworthy source) whether it is a tree or a man.
He must have faith in the words of his bystander. Doubts
are eliminated by further inquiry. When he sees the
tree as a tree, of course, all his doubts about the
truth are eliminated. Similarly, when a j~nAnI knows
the absolute truth as clearly as he knows the fruit
in his hands, shruti says that all his doubts are dispelled – chidyante
sarva saMsamshayAH. Mu. Up II-2-8. Hence, doubts are
the result of aj~nAnam or ignorance about the truth
of the object.
If the seer is definite that it is a tree and not a man, then
his knowledge is pramA or valid since subsequent transactions,
if there are any, will not negate the knowledge he has gained.
On the other hand, if a seer is definite that it is a man,
then the knowledge is in error (viparyaya or bhrama), since
a subsequent transaction could prove that it is not a man but
a tree. Since he is definite about his knowledge that it is
a man and has no doubts, he therefore makes no attempt to investigate
further into the truth behind his perceptual knowledge. If
he happens to try to transact with that knowledge and finds
to his surprise that he was mistaken, then he would recognize
that his earlier cognition was a mistake. We do operate with
many mistaken notions without knowing that they are mistakes – the
biggest mistake we make is taking the world that we see as
real. We are so convinced, since it is
transactionally real, that it is very difficult to get rid
of the notion even when the scripture tells us that ‘all
this that you see is Brahman’. Hence, the error is called
viparIta bhAvana and requires constant contemplation (nididhyAsana)
in order to be able to affirm or firmly abide in the scriptural
knowledge.
When defining an object such as a tree, a rope, a snake or
a man, there are inherent or intrinsic attributes (svAbhAvika
lakShaNa-s) that differentiate each object from the other objects
in the world. Thus, a tree is different from a man and a snake
is different from a rope. We have two words in Sanskrit – one
is visheShaNa and the other is lakShaNa. Both are normally
translated as ‘attribute’, although they are somewhat
different. Broadly speaking, visheShaNa-s are those attributes
that distinguish objects within their own genus or family.
For example, a white cow is different from a brown cow, or
a big cow is different from a small cow. All cows have some
generic or inherent attributes that make them cows and not
horses or donkeys. Those generic qualities that differentiate
a cow from a horse, or a tree from a man, are called lakShaNa-s.
They are also called asAdhAraNa lakShaNa-s or differentiating
attributes of the object.
If one asks: ‘Is there one specific and unique
lakShaNa that differentiates one object from the other?’,
the answer is a definite NO. Where there is one, we
call it the ‘necessary and sufficient’ qualification
for the object – svarUpa lakShaNa. tArkika-s or
logicians tried to define a generalized svarUpa lakShaNa,
or necessary and sufficient qualification, by stating
that a cow is that which has ‘cow-ness’,
a tree is that which has ‘tree-ness’ and
a rope is that which has ‘rope-ness’ etc.
Obviously, ‘rope-ness’ is different from ‘snake-ness’,
and ‘tree-ness’ is different from ‘man-ness’.
They appear to be necessary and sufficient qualifications
or svarUpa lakShaNa-s. However, there is an inherent
problem in these definitions, because one is trying
to define a svarUpa lakShaNa for an object that does
not have one. If we ask what is this ‘cow-ness’ that
a cow has, then one can only restate the definition
as: ‘cow-ness’ is that which a cow has,
since cow is that object which has ‘cow-ness’ and
that is different from the ‘horse-ness’ that
a horse has. We have not become any wiser.
Inherently, the problem lies in the fact that there
is no specific lakShaNa that I can identify as being
the necessary and sufficient qualification or svarUpa
lakShaNa of any object in this universe. All definitions,
including cow-ness of the cow etc, become circular definitions
(chakraka doSha), and are only operational for transactional
purposes. In addition, none of the five senses can gather
that cow-ness of the cow and horse-ness of the horse.
A cow is recognized as a cow, with all the inherent
attributes of cow that the senses can gather together.
A cow may have a specific distinguishing organ that
distinguishes it from a horse or a donkey, but that
distinguishing organ is only part of the cow and
not the cow itself to qualify as svarUpa lakShaNa.
Because of the lack of any specific attributes that distinguish
an object from the rest of the objects in the universe, doubts
and errors are possible in the perceptual processes. The basis
for the error lies in the fact that some of the attributes
are similar. This is called sAdRRishya. Thus, a rope is taken
for a snake only because there are some common attributes between
the two. The rope is not mistaken for an elephant or a mountain
but for a snake, since the senses are gathering only those
attributes that are common to both. Similarly, a man is taken
for a stump or a tree due to the limited or incomplete attributes
of the object gathered by the sense due to semi-darkness. A
tree is immovable while a man can move but, in the time span
during which the observation is made, a man may remain without
movement. Therefore, doubts and errors can arise during perception,
since knowledge of the objects is based purely on the attributes
that the senses gather during the observation.
In the case of error, there is vagueness in the attributive
knowledge, since the attributes gained by the senses are not
discriminative enough to differentiate between man and the
tree. It could be a man or it could be a tree. When the seer
makes a definitive judgment, based on the attributes that his
mind has gathered from his senses, it becomes a pramA from
his point of view. But it is bhrama from the point of view
of the reality, as defined by a referee, or discovered by the
seer as a result of his own subsequent transaction.
In advaita vedAnta, error is generally classified as adhyAsa
or superimposition. Shankara provides an exhaustive analysis
in his ‘adhyAsa bhAShya’ before he begins his bhAShya
on the brahmasUtra. The adhyAsa bhAShya of Shankara has been
exhaustively explained in http://www.advaita.org.uk/discourses/real/adhyasa.htm.
Here we discuss some aspects of it with reference to the errors
in perceptions.
Shankara defines adhyAsa as ‘atasmin tatbuddhiH’ - ‘apprehension
of something as something else’. In adhyAsa, two
types of errors are possible:
1) perceiving something other than what it is. This involves
the false assertion of one thing for another, e.g. perceiving
a snake where there is a rope. Here the attributes of the object
perceived are incomplete, for whatever reason.
2) Perceiving something with attributes that do not
belong to it, i.e. falsely assigning attribute of one
thing to another; e.g. attributing ‘redness’ to
a clear crystal because of its proximity to a red cloth.
Here the attribute of the red cloth is falsely superimposed
on the clear crystal.
Seeing a ghost instead of a post, silver instead of
nacre, mirage water, the world of plurality instead
of Brahman are all errors of the first type, wherein
one thing is mistaken for another. Seeing the movement
of trees in the opposite direction to which the train
is moving, sunrise and sunset; the changeless self appearing
as changing; the crystal appearing red in the presence
of a red cloth are examples of the second type, wherein
attributes that do not belong to it are wrongly superimposed.
In both cases, the substantive is unaffected by the
perceptual knowledge, fundamentally because the knowledge
is attributive.
In adhyAsa, there is no physical or mental superimposition
of objects; nor does it involve perception of some imaginary
object such as occurs during hallucinations or the mental projections
of the dream state. Hence, it is not a prAtibhAsika error.
When one sees a snake where there is a rope, there is an actual
object present out there. It is not an imagination or a dream
that we see a snake. The same is the case when one sees a man
standing where there is only the trunk of a tree. Hence, Shankara
defines adhyAsa also as ‘satyAnRRita mithunIkaraNam adhyAsam’ – superimposition
of true and false together to arrive at a unitary perception.
There is a real object at the perceptual level – vastu
j~nAnam. The vastu j~nAnam is gained through perception via
attributes only. What exactly is the substantive of the vastu
or object is not known, since attributive knowledge cannot
bring in substantive knowledge. The assertion that ‘there
is an object out there that is being seen’ comes with
the knowledge that the attributes that are being perceived
cannot exist without a substantive. Hence, that there is an
object is ascertained by the perception only. But, based on
the attributes gathered, cognition of the object is different
from the substantive – thus, a false object is perceived
in place of a real object.
One fellow may see the stump of tree, while the other
fellow may see a real man out there. Thus, for the same
substantive, one person sees a tree and another sees a man
standing. ‘Out there is an object’ is the
knowledge from the point of both perceivers. From their
individual points of view, both are valid perceptions
as per advaita. But the substantives that they associate
with the object they perceive are different. Let us
suppose that there is an independent knowledgeable person,
whom we can call the referee, who knows experientially
that it is indeed a tree and not a man. He would characterize
one perception as real and the other as false. The referee’s
knowledge is substantial since he has transactional
knowledge with the tree in some form or another.
From the point of view of the perceivers, both have
perceived the object since their senses have brought
attributes that they could see (measure) within the
external constraints (dim light, etc), and both know
that there is an object out there. Based on the information
they have, one says it is a man and the other says it
is a tree. If their senses could not gather any attributes,
because it was too dark or they were blind for example,
then there would be no error since no object would be
perceived. There would be ignorance of the existence
of the object out there. If the light is bright enough
so that the senses can gather all the attributes of
the object, then the possibility for any error is reduced,
since the attributive content of the vRRitti is sufficient
to distinguish man from a stump of a tree or snake from
a rope.
Hence, partial knowledge (or partial ignorance) contributes
to a mixture of real (that there is an object out there)
and unreal (that the object is a snake) giving rise
to errors in perception. Hence, Shankara defines adhyAsa
as satyAnRRita mithunIkaraNam adhyAsam – mixing
of real and unreal parts to arrive at a unitary perception
of snake or man, etc. Since, as far as the perceivers
are concerned, their intellects have made definitive
conclusions about the perceived objects, from their
reference point their knowledge is definitive and neither
doubtful nor in error. Even though the perceptions are
unreal (from the point of view of the referee), the
reactions that arise as a consequence of their definitive
perceptions can be real – such as fear associated
with the cognition of snake. The reactions of the body
such as increased blood pressure, sweating, etc are
all real.
Proceed to the next
essay.
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