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        Part XX - Questions related to
         Perceptuality (part 1) 
       VP has established that the criteria for perceptuality
         is that the subject consciousness is the same as the
         object consciousness. An object is nothing but consciousness
         (Brahman) with name and form, i.e. the ‘attributes’ of
         the object. Perceptuality of the object occurs in the
         mind when the consciousness underlying the subject becomes
         one with the consciousness that is the substantive of
         the object, the attributes of the object being only
         superimpositions on the substantive consciousness. The
         fact that 'I am conscious' is direct and immediate knowledge – no
         pramANa is required to know that I am a conscious entity.
         The criterion of perceptuality therefore demands the
         unity in the consciousness of the subject and that of
         the object. We can say that perception of an object
         is direct and immediate since the substantive of both
         the subject and the object in the mind is consciousness
         alone – this is unity at the substantive level
         and duality at the transactional level.  
       Additional requirements and implications of the criteria
         of perception are illustrated below using question and
         answer format.  
       On Dharma and Adharma  
       Q. If the criterion for perceptuality is that the subject
         consciousness is the same as the object, then one should
         perceive righteous and unrighteous (dharma and adharma)
         instead of inferring them based on the good and bad
         results that they generate. The criteria for perceptuality
         have been met since the consciousness limited by them
         is not different from the subject consciousness and
         existence of righteousness etc is not apart from that
         of the subject.  
       A. That is not so. Here the VP reminds us that, in
         addition to the above criteria at the substantial level,
         there is also a requirement at the transactional level
         that the mental mood should have attributes as its contents.
         In fact, to put this more precisely, the attributes
         of the mental moods should be perceptible. In the case
         of righteous and unrighteousness, the attributes are
         imperceptible as was discussed before.  
       Hence we can restate the criteria for perceptuality
         of an object. The criteria relate to both the substantive
         level and the transactional level (an object has to
         have attributes at the transactional level, which are
         superimposed on the substantive Brahman). At the substantive
         level, the consciousness and existence of the subject
         are not different from the object. At the transactional
         level, the mental mood or vRRitti that corresponds to
         the object should have contents/attributes of the object.
         The complete perception of an object involves: Brahman
         + the attributes of the object. Brahman is substantial,
         whereas the attributes are superimpositions (adhyAsa).
         VP establishes the criteria for perceptuality in terms
         of both. In the case of dharma and adharma, righteous
         and unrighteous, the attributes are imperceptible. Even
         though we meet the substantial part, the transactional
         part is not met. Because of the imperceptibility of
         their attributes, the knowledge of dharma and adharma
         is difficult and has to be known only through shAstra-s.  
       Can perception of one attribute cause perception of
         the other?  
       Q. If an object has two attributes (say color and size),
         the perception of one (say color) should also lead to
         perception of the other (the size). Since both attributes
         are locussed on one object, the substantive, the limiting
         consciousness is the same for both. The mind, through
         the senses, perceives the attributes and a vRRitti is
         formed. We are meeting all the criteria for perception;
         the consciousness and existence of the knower, subject,
         is the same as that of the object and object has perceptible
         attributes. Since the object is meeting all the perceptuality
         criteria, one should perceive the object with both color
         and size. Hence, perception of one attribute should
         lead to the perception of the other.  
       A. No. When one perceives only one attribute, say color,
         the vRRitti associated with it will have only that attribute.
         The consciousness and the existence of the subject with
         the object only extend to that attributive existence.
         For the perception of size, the vRRitti has to have
         the associated size attribute. Perception of one does
         not lead to the other. vRRitti-s associated with the
         other attributes have to be formed for complete and
         unambiguous cognition of the object.  
       What is implied in the perceptuality criteria is that
         perception is limited to the vRRitti formed of the object
         . If the sense data are incomplete, to that extent the
         object perception is also incomplete. We defined object
         as <limiting consciousness-existence (Brahman) + A
         + B + C + D + …. attributes>. For perceptuality,
         the limiting consciousness-existence of the subject
         extends to the limiting consciousness-existence of the
         object + whatever attributes the senses have gathered
         up to that point, say A and B but not C and D. Then
         the immediate and direct knowledge of the object relates
         to an object with A and B attributes but not with C
         and D. If C and D are imperceptible for whatever reason,
         then an object devoid of C and D is perceived. In the
         subsequent recognition process, if A and B are insufficiently
         discriminative to recognize the object from other similar
         objects based on memory, then knowledge could be erroneous.
         Hence VP says the definition of perceptuality is not
         wrongly extended.  
       Proceed to the next
        essay.  |