Now we address some of the objections and provide
responses (this is a format commonly used to clarify
the concepts that have been presented).
Part XIII - Some Clarifications
Regarding Internal Perceptions
Q. If happiness is a mental mood that is perceived
directly, then the recollection of that happiness from
one's own memory should also be considered as perception
of happiness directly and immediately.
If we recall, the definition
of a pramANa when recollection is allowed is 'abAdhita
arthaviShayaka jnAnatvam' – (a)
'non-negatable' and (b) objectifiable entity. However
the question here is, does this recollection of happiness
come under direct and immediate perception, since there
is no object ‘outside’ and recollection
involves some kind of mental mood or vRRitti which is
perceived as it forms. It is somewhat similar to the
original vRRitti that was formed when we perceived the
happiness. But, since the original mental mood of happiness
that was perceived is now stored in the memory, the
question is whether the recollection also involves a
vRRitti j~nAnam or knowledge of mental mood.
A. VP says that is not so. The recollection of the
mental mood is not the same as the experience of the
original mental mood. The recollection involves recollection
of the previously ‘collected’ event. Recollection
is occurring in the present while the object of recollection
is from the past. There is no corresponding 'object'
(state of happy mental mood) in the case of the recollected
vRRitti. The recollection is 'I was happy' rather than
'I am happy'. To state this more clearly, the limiting
adjunct for the recollected mental vRRitti and the limiting
adjunct of the happy mental mood when it was experienced
relate to two different times. Hence the corresponding
limiting consciousnesses of the two vRRitti-s are different.
Therefore, the criterion for perception is that the
two limiting consciousnesses must occupy the same space
and time, in order for the union of the two to take
place.
Emotional moods such as happiness (pleasure), anger,
hatred, love, etc are experienced internally. They are
called internal perceptions, since they are direct
and immediate. They are perceived and experienced as
they arise in the mind. When I am angry, I do not think
first and then deduce or infer that I am angry. The
experience of anger is immediate and direct, just as
with the perception of an object. I may
have to reflect and analyze in order to discover why
I am angry but the fact that I am angry is immediate
and direct.
Hence these moods are immediately perceived,
known and experienced. As we discussed before,
the perception of objects occurs through vRittis, with
the attributes of the objects as their contents. Similarly,
anger and other emotional moods are perceived by
their corresponding vRittis, with the associated attributes
of those mental moods as the contents. When an emotion
arises as a vRitti of the object, the witnessing consciousness
illumines the vRitti and the reflection of the consciousness
by the vRitti becomes the knowledge of the vRitti.
The happiness that results from sense enjoyment is
considered to be a vRitti because it is a conditional
happiness with the associated knowledge that 'I am happy'.
Hence, these pleasures or pockets of happiness are conditional
happiness due to the limiting reflecting consciousness
of the vRitti that is formed. When one says 'I am happy',
that is a thought in the mind and it is a recognition
of the knowledge of the happiness that one has just
experienced. The 'I
am happy' thought
is different from being happy when the knowledge
of the mental mood of happiness occurs. ‘I am
happy’, ‘I
was happy’ or ‘I will be happy’,
etc are vRitti-s that are different from the emotion
of happiness that is experienced when the internal
perception of happiness occurs.
'I was happy', for example,
is a recollection of a past happy mood.
Recollection of the happy mood does not necessarily
have in its vRitti the original contents of the happy-emotion.
The recollection of happiness can only be a vRRitti
in the thought form, since one cannot regenerate
the same mental mood via recollection. Experience of
happiness is in the present, by direct perceptual
experience, while the recollection of the
thought of the experience 'I
was happy’ does not have the same attributive
contents in that vRitti-thought. This is viewed by VP as
non-unity of the limiting consciousnesses of the two vRRitti-s
(the past and the present), since unity of limiting consciousness
is the criterion for direct perceptual knowledge. I.e.
'I was happy' is a recollective vRitti and is not identical
with the vRitti formed when I was happy. There is no unity
in the limiting consciousness of the two vRittis for directly
perceiving the two as one.
Here we raise an important issue:
If we consider that emotions are some kind of mental perturbations
expressed as vRRitti-s in a general sense, then how are
these ‘emotional’ vRRitti-s
stored in the memory, so that one may recollect them
in the future? I recognize that some of the discussions
can border on speculation, since I do not know how the
mind stores any sort of information in the memory for
subsequent recollection. There is a similar problem
in respect of storing the genetic information coded
in genes for passing on to the next generation. We just
marvel at the programmer and bow down at this intelligence
and speculate how it is done.
In the case of perception of external objects such
as ‘this is jar’, ‘that is a cow’,
the attributive knowledge is stored as information in
the memory together with information about time and
space as conceived by the mind (in relation to previous
or subsequent events). In the case of emotions such
as happiness, fear, anger, etc, it is our experience
that we do not store those mental perturbations directly
but as thoughts associated with the feelings. However,
thoughts are not feeling per se. Hence, the thought
that ‘I am happy’ is not the same as being happy.
It is our experience that we cannot be happy by recollecting
that ‘I was happy’, since recollection of ‘I
was happy’ does not generate the same mental,
emotional happiness that I had at that time. The same
is true for anger and other emotions. Hence, it appears
that what is stored in the memory is not the exact content
of emotional moods of the mind but knowledge as a subsequent
thought about those moods. The memory therefore involves
recollection of the thought of happiness and
not the state of happiness experienced in the
past. Hence we can say that the contents of the 'I was
happy' thought and the mental mood of happiness that
existed when I was happy are different - there is no
unity in contents.
Essentially VP says that by recollecting that I was angry,
I cannot be angry now. I might be angry again if I recapitulate
all the thoughts or situations that led up to the original
anger, providing that I still feel that those accounts
have not been settled. This time the anger could be more
or less intense depending on how strong the rekindled
emotions are. Negative emotions like anger, hatred, or
frustrations etc can be stronger since they are intense,
and continuous recollection would only reinforce those
emotions. One can get cocooned in these repeated emotions
and frustrations to the extent that one can become neurotic
or mentally depressed. In such cases, it is not the recollection
of the emotions but recreation of those emotions, which
are perceived immediately as they rise in the mind.
Proceed to the next
essay. |
